We derive representations for the stock price drift and volatility in the equilibrium of agents with arbitrary, heterogeneous utility functions and with the aggregate dividend following an arbitrary Markov diffusion. We introduce a new, intrinsic characteristic of the aggregate dividend process that we call the "rate of discounting volatility" and show that, in equilibrium, the size of market price of risk is determined by the market price of discounted dividend volatility (DDV), discounted at that rate, and multiplied by the aggregate risk aversion. The stock price volatility is equal to the market price of DDV plus a volatility risk premium. In particular, stock price volatility is larger than the dividend volatility if the aggregate risk aversion is decreasing, dividend volatility is countercylical and the rate of discounting volatility is procyclical. We also obtain a representation for the optimal portfolios.
Introduction
What is the equilibrium prediction for the market price of risk and volatility of the risky asset in a complete market economy populated by heterogeneous agents? And what is the hedging behavior of those agents in equilibrium?
Those are the two main questions we answer in this paper.
The basic intuition comes from Merton's continuous-time analog of CAPM.
That is, with a CRRA representative agent with risk aversion γ and the dividend following a geometric Brownian motion with volatility σ, equilibrium behavior resembles that of the standard CAPM: the market price of risk is given by γσ, stock price volatility equals σ, and the optimal portfolio is myopic and instantaneously mean-variance efficient. We extend these results and allow for
• an arbitrary dividend process;
• heterogeneous agents with arbitrary utility functions.
We show that
• the market price of risk is obtained as the expected value, under the risk-neutral probability, of the aggregate (relative) risk aversion multiplied by dividend volatility discounted at the rate we call the "rate of discounting volatility". This rate depends only on the structure of the dividends process;
• the rate of discounting volatility can be interpreted as the speed of mean-reversion of the log-dividend process 1 if it is positive, and rate of growth if it is negative;
• the stock price volatility can be decomposed into excess component and fundamental component. The fundamental component is given by the market price of dividend volatility, discounted at the above mentioned rate;
• excess volatility is given by a volatility risk premium, whose sign is determined by the co-movement of the dividend with aggregate risk aversion and discounted dividend volatility;
• the non-myopic (hedging) component of an agent's portfolio is given by a portfolio risk premium, whose sign is determined by the co-movement of agent's wealth and risk tolerance with aggregate risk aversion and discounted dividend volatility.
The most important general message from the above results is that the volatility of the dividends by itself is not enough to determine equilibrium properties. For example, bounds on the product of risk aversion and dividend volatility may substantially under-(over-) estimate the true equilibrium risk premium if the economy if growing (mean-reverting).
In the case of lognormal dividend, dividend volatility has been commonly interpreted as the fundamental component of the stock price volatility (see, e.g., Bhamra and Uppal (2009)). As follows from above, when dividend is not a geometric Brownian motion, this may lead to under-or over-estimation depending on the sign of the discount rate.
The above mentioned representations allow us to make predictions about equilibrium behavior. Suppose that the product of aggregate risk aversion and dividend volatility is countercyclical, 2 dividend volatility is countercyclical and the rate of discounting volatility is pro-cyclical. Then, All signs are reversed for the reversed cyclicality conditions.
The fact that countercyclical risk aversion leads to countercyclical market price of risk is very intuitive and agrees with analogous results in the literature on habit formation (see, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) ). However, our result implies that market price of risk may be countercyclical even if risk aversion is procyclical, but countercyclicality of dividend volatility is sufficiently strong.
Excess volatility is a well known stylized fact. See, e.g., Shiller (1981) , LeRoy and Porter (1981) , Shapiro (1985, 1991) and West (1988) . Therefore, the fact that in our setup counter-cyclical risk aversion always leads to excess stock volatility gives credence to the model.
The intuition behind it is as follows. In good states with high expected future dividends, aggregate risk aversion is low and so the agent is willing to hold the stock even it the return is low (i.e., the price is high). This makes the price go up very high in good states and, by the same arguments, go down fast in bad states, and therefore drives price volatility up.
The result about monotonicity of optimal portfolios is also important.
Almost all papers on heterogeneous equilibria use this monotonicity property as the basis for economic intuition. See, e.g., Dumas (1989) , Wang (1996) , Basak and Cuoco (1998) , Basak (2005) , Bhamra and Uppal (2009) . However, to the best of our knowledge, no proof of this property has ever been given even in an economy with only two agents.
The relation between hedging portfolios and prudence is intriguing. It is known that prudence is responsible for the precautionary savings effect (see, Kimball (1991) Our paper is also related to a recent work of Mele (2007) . He studies monotonicity/concavity properties of equilibrium stock price and their relation to equilibrium volatility dynamics. He introduces a new object, the risk adjusted discount rate, and rewrites the equilibrium stock price as the present value of risk adjusted future dividends, discounted at this rate. Even though the idea of such a representation is similar to the one of this paper, there is no direct connection between the risk adjusted discount rate and the rate of discounting volatility. The former depends on the endogenous equilibrium market price of risk, whereas the latter is an intrinsic property of the exogenously given dividend process. Furthermore, we obtain representations for the instantaneous moments of the price, and not of the price itself.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the setup and notation. In Section 3 we introduce the rate of discounting volatility and derive representations for market price of risk, volatility, as well as drift and volatility of the market price of risk, and study their behavior. Section 4 is devoted to equilibrium optimal portfolios. Section 5 concludes.
Setup and Notation

The Model
We consider a standard setting similar to that of Wang (1996) . The economy has a finite horizon and evolves in continuous time. Uncertainty is described by a one-dimensional, standard Brownian motion B t , t ∈ [0 , T ] on a complete probability space (Ω, F T , P ), where F is the augmented filtration generated by B t . There is a single share of a risky asset in the economy, the stock, which pays a terminal dividend D T such that
This diffusion process lives on (0, +∞).
We assume that σ D (D t ) > 0, and that µ D and σ D are such that a unique strong solution exists. Moreover, we assume µ
We also assume that a zero coupon bond with instantaneous constant risk-free rate r is available in zero net supply.
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There are K competitive agents behaving rationally, and agent k is initially endowed with ψ k > 0 shares of stock, an the total supply of the stock is normalized to one,
In general, whenever we use a derivative of a function, we implicitly assume it exists. 5 The assumption of constant r is introduced only for simplicity of exposition.
Agent k chooses portfolio strategy π k t , the portfolio weight at time t in the risky asset, as to maximize the expected utility
of its final wealth W kT , where the wealth W kt of agent k evolves as
Here, S t is the stock price at time t. The instantaneous drift and volatility of the stock price S t are denoted by µ 
We assume that u k is C 2 (R + ), and for the results involving prudence, we assume u k is C 3 (R + ).
Equilibrium
Definition 2.1. We say that the market is in equilibrium if the agents behave optimally and both the risky asset market and the risk-free market clear.
It is well known that the above financial market is complete, if the volatility process σ S t of the stock price is almost everywhere strictly positive. When the market is complete, there exists a unique stochastic discount factor (SDF) M = M T such that the stock price is given by
Equivalently,
is the density of the equivalent martingale measure Q and
Because of the market completeness, any equilibrium allocation is Paretoefficient and can be characterized as an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. See, e.g.
Duffie and Huang (1986), Wang (1996) .
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Introduce the inverse of the marginal utility
It is well known that in this complete market setting the optimal terminal wealth is of the form
where y k is determined via the budget constraint
We formalize this in Proposition 2.1. Equilibrium SDF M and parameters y k solve the equations
6 Because the endowments are co-linear (all agents hold shares of the same single stock), it can be shown that, under some conditions on agents' utilities, the equilibrium is in fact unique up to a multiplicative factor, and unique if we fix the risk-free rate. See, e.g., Dana (1995) , Dana (2001) . If the endowment is neither bounded away from zero nor from infinity, some additional care is needed to verify the existence of equilibrium. See, e.g., Dana (2001) and Malamud (2008) . We implicitly assume throughout the paper that an equilibrium exists. 7 We assume a unique such y k exists.
The Rate of Discounting Volatility and the Equilibrium Stock Price
Since the market is complete, it is well known that the prices in our heterogeneous economy coincide with those in an artificial economy, populated by a single, representative agent with a utility function U , and the equilibrium stochastic discount factor equals the marginal utility of the representative agent, evaluated at the aggregate endowment,
That is, the function U (x) satisfies the equation
Let
be the relative risk aversion of the representative agent.
We call the process c(D t ) the rate of discounting volatility.
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The name "rate of discounting volatility" is justified by the following Theorem 3.1. The equilibrium market price of risk
is given by
Theorem 3.1 shows that the dividend volatility is priced at a discount, with the rate of discounting being equal to c(D s ). The following result is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.1:
Under the equilibrium risk neutral measure, the drift of the equilibrium market price of risk is always equal to c(D t ).
The result of Corollary 3.1 is somewhat surprising. It means that, even with arbitrary dividend process, the drift (under risk-neutral measure) of the equilibrium market price of risk is independent of the representative agent's utility and is determined solely by c(x), an intrinsic characteristic of the dividend process. Thus, it is important to understand the nature of the function c(x). We first note that the following is true.
Lemma 3.1. The rate of discounting volatility is invariant under transfor-
This invariance property has important consequences. It means that structural properties of c(x) (such as, e.g., monotonicity in x) are determined solely by the dynamical properties of the diffusion process D t . In particular, since any diffusion process can be reduced to a constant volatility process by a functional transformation, we get that the following is true, as a consequence of Lemma 3.1.
Corollary 3.2. The rate of volatility discounting c(D t ) is constant if there exists a one-to-one function g ∈ C 3 (R + ) such that D t = g(A t ) where
In that case, c = b.
for some values of a and σ A , where
Thus, the rate c of discounting volatility can also be interpreted as the speed of mean-reversion or mean growth rate of the log-dividend process log D t , possibly after a transformation. If c = b > 0, there is mean reversion and the volatility is priced at discount. On the other hand, if b < 0, there is growth in the dividend process and the volatility is priced at premium, appreciated at growth rate |b|.
We will now need the following Definition 3.2. We denote by
the disounted volatility. The market price V t of discounted volatility (MPDV) is given by
denote the infinum and supremum of the relative risk aversion of agent k, and
sup be the infinum and supremum of the relative risk aversion of the representative agent. It is known (see, Wilson (1968) and Hara, Huang and 9 Since, by assumption σ D (y) is positive and C 2 , F (x) is strictly increasing and therefore, by the implicit function theorem, F −1 ∈ C 3 and is also strictly increasing.
Kuzmics (2007)) that the representative agent's risk aversion is a weighted average of individual risk aversions. In particular, the following is true Lemma 3.2. We have
The following result is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 3.1. The equilibrium market price of risk satisfies
In particular,
That is, the size of the equilibrium market price of risk is determined by the size of relative risk aversion and MPDV. Thus, even if the volatility σ D is constant, equilibrium market price of risk may happen to be larger or smaller than γ σ D if c < 0 or c > 0 respectively. This is intuitive, as c < 0 corresponds to a growing economy, and c > 0 to a mean-reverting economy.
The representation in Theorem 3.1 can also be used to get dynamic properties of the equilibrium market price of risk . We will need the following auxiliary 10 Lemma 3.3. Suppose that f and g are both increasing (decreasing). Then, the following is true
is also monotone increasing (decreasing);
10 Item (1) of Lemma 3.3 is contained in Mele (2007) .
(2) we have
if h has the same direction of monotonicity as f and g, and the inequality reverses if h has the opposite direction of monotonicity.
Since D t is the only state variable driving the state of the economy, its fluctuations determine the business cycle of the economy. We make a formal
The following result is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.3
Corollary 3.3. We have
Note that there is a strong empirical evidence that the market price of risk λ t is countercyclical (see, Fama and French (1989) , Ferson and Harvey (1991) ). Therefore, we would like to understand how plausible the assumptions of item (1) It turns out that monotonicity properties of σ D (x) and c(x) are crucial for determining various static and dynamic properties of the equilibrium
be the conditional covariance of random variables X and Y under the riskneutral measure Q. We have the following is result.
Theorem 3.2. The equilibrium stock price volatility is given by
Furthermore, S t is always procyclical and σ S t > 0 almost surely.
The market price V t of discounted volatility is the fundamental volatility component, determined by solely by the size of the underlying dividend volatility. Theorem 3.2 implies that the equilibrium volatility is given by fundamental volatility plus a volatility risk premium. Even though, in con-trast to standard CAPM (or, CCAPM) risk premium, the covariance in (7) is under the risk-neutral measure Q, the interpretation of the volatility risk premium is similar: the spread σ S t − V t between the stock volatility and the fundamental volatility is determined by the co-movement of aggregate risk aversion and discounted volatility with the dividend.
It is well known (see, Shiller (1981) 1985, 1991) and West (1988) ) that the stock volatility cannot be explained by the volatility of future dividends. Usually (see, e.g., Bhamra and Uppal (2009)), stock volatility is decomposed into the fundamental and excess volatility, with the latter being responsible for the large discrepancy between σ S t and σ D t . Expression (7) shows that the fundamental volatility V t by itself may already substantially exceed dividend volatility if the economy is growing (that is, the rate of discounting volatility is negative).
Using Lemma 3.3, it is possible to determine the sign of excess volatility. (2) if the relative risk aversion γ U is increasing and and γ U (x) ≥ 1, the volatility is procyclical and the rate c(D s ) of discounting volatility risk is counter-cyclical, then σ
The main message of Corollary 3.4 is that, to achieve a high stock price volatility, we need a negative, procyclical discount rate, that is, a slowly growing economy, as well as countercyclical risk aversion and dividend volatility.
Note that the conditions of item (1) are almost the same as those in Corollary 3.3, needed for the counter-cyclicality of the market price of risk .
The intuition for this is as follows. By Theorem 3.2 stock price S t is always procyclical. Thus, if the market price of risk is countercyclical, the stock is cheap in bad states (those with low D t ) and offers a high instantaneous return, that will force agents to buy more shares in those states and make the equilibrium price move faster and make it more volatile. The same argument applies in good states. On the contrary, if the market price of risk is procyclical, the high market price of risk offered by the the stock in good states ( with high D t ) is offset by the high price S t in those states. This drives down the trading volume and reduces the equilibrium volatility.
We would now like to have a closer look at the dynamics of the risk premum λ t .
Proposition 3.2. Assume that the representative agent's utility function U is C 3 (R + ). We have
It is known that, in the benchmark model when D t is a geometric Brownian motion and γ U is constant, market price of risk is also constant and hence σ λ t = 0. The reason is that, in that case, c, σ D and γ U are all constant.
Identity (8) shows that stochastic volatility of the equilibrium market price of risk is generated by the the structure of representative risk aversion and discounted volatility. To understand the effect of various components, we must separately consider the cases of pro-and counter-cyclical risk premia. The term
is the most complex. 11 Clearly, it is non-zero if and only if c (x) is non-zero.
Thus, we can interpret it as the market price of discounted changes in the rate of discounting volatility.
We illustrate our results by the following Example 3.1. Suppose we have
In this case, the log-dividend process A := log D is a mean-reverting Gaussian process: dA t = (a − 0.5σ 2 − bA t )dt + σ dB t .
11 It coincides with the the price of an artificial security paying the dividend rate
, but discounted at the rate 2 c(D T ).
In that case, σ D = σ, c = b, and all the formulae substantially simplify and all the static and dynamic properties of equilibrium are determined solely by the properties of the aggregate risk aversion γ U . In particular, we have the following Proposition 3.3. Suppose that γ U is decreasing. Then,
(1) market price of risk is counter-cyclical and satisfies
(2) price volatility is larger than the discounted (or, appreciated, if
All statements of Proposition 3.3 follow directly from the results above. The results of Proposition 3.3 are easily extended to the case when g(log D t ) = A t for some monotone increasing function g, because, by Lemma 3.1, the rate c of discounting volatility remains constant in this setting. By Ito's formula, σ D (D t ) = (g (D t )) −1 σ and the results will depend on whether g is concave or convex.
Optimal Portfolios
We start with the following Proposition 4.1. The optimal portfolio π k t is positive and is given by
One important consequence of Proposition 4.1 is that there is no shortselling in equilibrium. The reason is that, because markets are complete, optimal wealths W kT of all agents are increasing in D T . Hence, there is no incentive for an agent to short the stock. In particular, this explains why market price of risk is always positive in equilibrium (see, Theorem 3.1). If the market price of risk were negative, it would be optimal for all agents to short the stock and markets would not clear. The same intuition implies that equity premium must be increasing in risk aversion: highly risk averse agents will only buy stock if it offers a sufficiently large equity premium.
In this section we will use Proposition 4.1 to derive various properties of equilibrium optimal portfolios. Denote by π log t the optimal portfolio of the log investor. It is well known that
An immediate consequence of Proposition 4.1 is showing monotonicity of optimal portfolios with respect to risk aversion in a multi-period model is a highly non-trivial problem. We will need the following Definition 4.1 (Ross (1981) ). Agent k is more risk averse than agent j in the sense of Ross if inf
In this case we write γ k ≥ R γ j .
This definition was introduced by Ross (1981) in the context of a static, one period problem with two risky assets. Ross showed that the above mentioned monotonicity result of Arrow does not hold if we only require a weak, pointwise inequality in risk aversion. The reason is that optimal portfolio choice becomes a non-local problem and local properties of risk aversion are not sufficient for the analysis. A similar phenomenon arises in our dynamic, multi-period optimization: even though one of the assets is locally riskless, the amount of money invested into it changes over time and thus, effectively, we get a problem with two risky assets, and Definition 4.1 becomes the right concept to consider. In fact, we have the following monotonicity of optimal portfolios relative to risk aversion:
The following is true:
(1) suppose that the product γ U (x) σ D (x) is decreasing and c is procyclical.
(2) suppose that the product γ U (x) σ D (x) is increasing and c is counter-
Note however that we do not know whether the results of item (1) ( (2)) hold for risk aversions below (above) one.
In the benchmark case when all agents in the economy have constant relative risk aversion, γ U is decreasing (see, Benninga and Mayshar (2000)) and we arrive at Corollary 4.1. Suppose that the economy is populated by heterogeneous CRRA agents. Then,
is countercyclical and c is procyclical, then optimal portfolio is decreasing in risk aversion for risk aversion above one;
is procyclical and c is countercyclical, then optimal portfolio is decreasing in risk aversion for risk aversion below one.
We will now study the structure of optimal portfolios in greater detail.
be the value function of agent k 12 and
the effective relative risk aversion of agent k at time t. Also denote
It is known (see, Merton (1971) ), that, when the market price of risk is constant, the optimal portfolio is myopic, instantaneously mean-variance efficient and is given by
The following is true Proposition 4.4. In equilibrium,
12 Note that U k t depends on D t but we suppress this dependence.
and therefore myopic optimal portfolio is given by
.
Representation (10) shows that the effective relative risk tolerance γ −1 k t (i.e., the risk tolerance of the value function) is given by the wealth-weighted market price of relative risk tolerance γ −1 k T . That is, effectively, the attitude of agent k towards risk is much more affected by his risk tolerance in good states (where his wealth is large), than by that in bad states (with small wealth).
We will denote 
There is a similarity between formula (11) and the expression (7) for the volatility risk premium . The reason is that π k t σ S t is simply the volatility of the wealth process W k t . The role of MPDV is played here by the myopic component π myopic k t , which is determined by the level of risk aversion and volatility. Similarly, in complete analogy with the volatility risk premium, π hedging k t is determined by the co-movement of the stochastic volatility and risk aversion.
The covariance representation for the hedging portfolio allows us to apply Lemma 3.3 and determine its sign. Let
be the relative prudence and relative risk tolerance of agent k.
The following is true
is decreasing and c is procyclical, then
is increasing and c is countercyclical, then
The above result is somewhat unexpected at first glance. Since the optimal portfolio of a log investor is always myopic, one would expect that the sign of the hedging component only depends on whether risk aversion is above or below one. However, Theorem 4.2 shows that the hedging motives depend on the properties of three derivatives of the utility and, consequently, on the derivative of the relative risk aversion. The intuition behind this is as follows: when relative risk aversion is not constant, the agent anticipates future stochastic fluctuations in his risk aversion and uses the non-myopic part of the portfolio to hedge against these fluctuations.
This phenomenon is also related to precautionary savings. As Kimball (1990) showed in a static, one period model, the strength of the precautionary savings motive for an agent anticipating stochastic fluctuations in his future income is determined by the relative prudence P k . Here, P k plays a similar role, determining the strength of savings/investment motive for an agent, anticipating future changes in the stochastic investment opportunity set.
Note also that under the conditions of item (1) in the above proposition, in a slowly growing economy, or in a rapidly mean-reverting economy, the hedging component of the portfolio is positive for investors whose risk aversion is large relative to prudence, and negative for investors whose risk aversion is small relative to prudence.
If we adopt Arrow (1965) hypothesis that γ k (x) is increasing, a direct calculation shows that this holds if and only if P k (x) ≤ γ k (x) + 1 and therefore, if γ k (x) ≥ 1, P k r k ≤ 2 and we arrive at 
For the benchmark, power utility case, P k r k = 1 + γ −1 k and the results take a simpler form Corollary 4.3. Suppose that γ k = const. The following is true
The intuition behind Corollary 4.3 is as follows. Under the conditions of item (1), Corollary 3.3 implies that the market price of risk is countercyclical.
An agent with high risk aversion γ k > 1 has a high marginal utility u k (x) = Example 4.1. We consider the setting of Example 3.1, when the log-dividend is a Gaussian mean-reverting process. We have, then, from the above results, Proposition 4.5. Suppose that γ U is decreasing. Then,
(1) optimal portfolios are increasing in risk aversion (in the sense of Ross) for risk aversion above one;
(2) the hedging portfolio of an agent k is positive (negative) if
Again, the results can be extended to the case when g(log D t ) is Gaussian mean-reverting for some monotone increasing function g.
Conclusions
We consider equilibrium in a continuous time economy, populated by heterogeneous agents maximizing expected utility from terminal wealth. We obtain representations of the equilibrium market price of risk , drift and volatility, as well as of the optimal portfolios, in terms of expected values under the riskneutral measure. The equilibrium values depend on the aggregate relative risk aversion and dividend volatility, discounted by a specific discount factor, called the rate of discounted volatility. In special cases, this rate is equal either to the mean-reversion rate, or to the growth rate of the log-dividend process. Using the obtained representations, we derive results on the size of the risk premia and stock volatility, as well as on the size of optimal portfolios relative to the associated risk aversion. It would be of interest to extend these results to agents who consume throughout the period, and/or to agents who also differ in their beliefs regarding the dividend process. We leave such extensions for future research. In a different direction, it would be interesting to test empirically the following predictions from our model: in a slowly growing economy, or in a rapidly mean-reverting economy, the market price of risk is counter-cyclical, the risky asset volatility is high, and the hedging component of the portfolio is positive for investors whose risk aversion is large relative to prudence, and negative for investors whose risk aversion is small relative to prudence.
A Proofs: Equilibrium Price Dynamics
Denote by D t the Malliavin derivative operator. 13 The following is the main technical result of the paper.
Proposition A.1. The drift and volatility of the stock price are given by
and the optimal portfolio of agent k is given by
where
and
Proof of Proposition A.1. Recall that price S t and the wealth of agent k satisfy log
We get the volatility σ S t as the Malliavin derivative D t log S t and we get σ S t π k t as the Malliavin derivative D t log W k t . Thus, we have
We will now calculate the Malliavin derivatives. For process D, it is well known that the Malliavin derivative
and (19) follows. Using this and (4), we can compute
Using the identity
we can compute
It remains to show the expression for the drift. By the martingale property, we can write,
where, by Clarke-Ocone formula and (22),
Applying Ito's formula, we get
Therefore,
and thus
Q.E.D.
The following result allows us to rewrite the Malliavin derivative D t D without involving stochastic integrals. It has also been proved by Detemple, Garcia and Rindisbacher (2003) in a slightly different form, but we present a derivation here for the reader's convenience.
Lemma A.1. We have
2 ) ds (27) and the claim follows.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The proof follows directly by substituting (26) into (18) .
Proof of Lemma 3.1. By (26),
On the other hand, from
and (26), applied to the processD t , we get
By Ito's formula, comparing the diffusion terms, we get
and therefore
which is what had to be proved. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. Pick any x 0 > 0. Let
It is easily verified that the diffusion F (D t ) has the dynamics of the form
and, therefore, X t = e F (Dt) has the dynamics
By Lemma 3.1, c D =const if and only if
That is, µ X (x) =ã − b log x, and A t = log X t = F (D t ) has the dynamics dA t = (ã − 0.5 − b Y t ) dt + dB t , and the claim follows. Q.E.D.
We will need the following known Lemma A.2. For any one-dimensonal diffusion, the function
is monotone increasing (decreasing) in x for all t ∈ [0, T ] if and only if so does g(x). Furthermore, if both g(x) and h(x) are increasing (or both decreasing), then
If both g, h are strictly increasing (or both strictly decreasing), then the inequality is also strict unless D T is constant almost surely. If one function is increasing and the other is decreasing, then the inequality reverses.
See, Herbst and Pitt (1991).
Lemma A.3. Suppose that F and G 1 , · · · , G N are monotone increasing functions. Then, for any N ∈ N and any {t 1 ≤ · · · t N } ⊂ [t, T ],
is monotone increasing in x and
Proof. The proof is by induction. For N = 1, we have
By Lemma A.2, the function inside the expectation is increasing in X t 1 and another application of Lemma A.2 provides monotonicity of E t [F (X T ) G t 1 (X t 1 )]. Now, by Lemma A.2,
and we are done. Suppose now that the claim has been proved for N. Then, Alternatively, by Clarke-Ocone formula, S t σ S t can be obtained as the conditional expectation (under Q) of the Malliavin derivative of D T , which is positive.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We have
By the Clarke-Ocone formula,
The claim follows from Lemma A.1 and Ito's formula and the following identity
B Proofs: Optimal Portfolios
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The claim follows directly from Proposition A.1 and (26). Since, by Ito's formula,
we need to show that W k t is monotone increasing in D t . But,
is increasing if and only if
and is decreasing otherwise.
